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T A B L E O F C O N T E N T S
For the foreseeable future, California’s electricity
market will be scarred by the “crisis” events of the
summer of 2000 and winter of 2001. While the
conditions underlying the emergency have passed, we
all will be paying for the residual effects for at least a
decade into the future.
To my mind, some of the heaviest costs are not the
immediate impacts of the crisis, measured in price
spikes, lost business and bankrupt utilities or market
players, but the lingering liabilities of the emergency
response—the heavy debts associated with power
procurement, the loss of confidence in markets and
market structures, the consistent compulsion of
politicians to cast blame and regulators to try to reassert
control over markets rather than fix the problems.
No one has come out of the emergency unscathed by
the costs or untainted by recrimination for their
actions, inactions or downright foolish behavior.
Although there are plenty of accusations about illegal
activities among power sellers, the sad irony of the
situation is that, to date, the only proven instances of
legal violations have been traced to state contractors
who failed to reveal or relinquish their financial
investments in companies with which they were
negotiating, and a breech of the neutrality policy by a
transmission system manager who purposely solicited
supply bids to result in a more favorable outcome for
the state.
What can we do about it now? 
With the worst of the crisis behind us, a growing body
of analysis that tells us what went wrong and some
educated guesses as to why, this seems to be a perfect
time to look at where we’ve been and determine a
better course for the future.
Is anyone willing to do that? I’m not entirely certain.
Recently, the California Energy Commission hosted a
day-long event meant to begin such a process, and
while it offered good presentations and entertained
several valid ideas, there was practically no interest
from the people and institutions that might actually do
something to put those ideas to work—little represen-
tation from the Legislature and none at all from the
governor’s office or the California Public Utilities
Commission. The California Independent System
Operator has begun another round in its perennial
process of “market redesign” to provide a more stable
operational structure that might be less susceptible to
overt manipulation, but it does not address the big
question about how California should proceed.
The CPUC has opened more than a half-dozen
investigations to review various aspects of the crisis and
consider policies for the future, but the common
thread running through them is the need to find
someone to blame and to assert control over entities
and operations where it either had been relinquished to
the restructured market or had never before been
exercised. 
Clearly, the regulatory pendulum has swung away from
promoting open markets and competition. The CPUC
is now articulating a policy to reinstitute cost-of-service
regulation over a utility industry that no longer exists
as it did a decade ago. CPUC president Loretta Lynch
this year told lawmakers that the failure of the market
necessitates giving back to utilities the “traditional
responsibility” for procuring power and restoring
traditional ratemaking. “The experiment did not work
and the way to make it work is that appropriate costs
are covered with a return on investment,” Lynch said.
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A F T E R T H E S T O R M
The commission also seriously contemplated a
retroactive suspension of electricity customers’ legal
rights to contract for non-utility power supplies. The
rationale for such a policy was that, by exercising
choice, those customers were avoiding their “fair share”
of the costs of the energy crisis. In a split decision, the
agency decided against overturning already existing
contracts but said it will fashion an “exit fee” on those
who entered new direct-access agreements since June
2001.
Similarly, Pacific Gas & Electric’s proposed plan for
reorganization to exit Chapter 11 bankruptcy is
attacked by the state as an attempted “regulatory
jailbreak” rather than being seen as a way to restore
fiscal stability. Conversely, when PG&E justifies its
plan to remove key regulatory assets from state
oversight to federal jurisdiction, it does so by providing
a litany of “policies that caused PG&E’s bankruptcy.”
The Legislature and the governor are now occupied
with other crises—both the budget emergency and the
need to be reelected—and energy matters have moved
to the back burners in Sacramento.
Given all this, many people are wondering whether
there remains any energy market at all to restore. 
A Search for Solutions
Recently, I conducted a series of interviews with noted
economists about California’s market to see if they
could offer ideas on what might be worth saving from
California’s foray into restructuring. (The following
report contains excerpts of these interviews. The full
text can be downloaded at www.ef.org). 
Paul Joskow, director of the Center for Energy and
Environmental Policy Research at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology.
Severin Borenstein, director of the University of
California Energy Institute.
Frank Wolak, professor of economics at Stanford
University and chair of Cal-ISO’s market surveillance
committee, as well as an associate at the UCEI.
Mark Bernstein, senior policy analyst at RAND
Corporation.
Bill Marcus, principal economist at JBS Energy.
Robert Michaels, economics professor at California
State University, Fullerton, and affiliate consultant
with Tabors, Caramanis & Associates.
Though he could not participate in an extensive
interview, noted economist Alfred Kahn offered a
few thoughts on preferred policies. 
And to address the practical implications of the state’s
response to the emergency, Dave Freeman, chair of
the California Consumer Power and Conservation
Financing Authority.
As might be expected, what I’m discovering from such
a diverse body of thinkers is that there are no simple
solutions to the problems that triggered the California
blackout crisis and few areas of consensus about how
to proceed in the future. But at least the exercise has
provided an opportunity to look forward, to determine
what might be done to secure a more stable energy
market, and more importantly, what should be done
about the other great failure of the California
marketplace—the continued fragmentation of policy
and ill coordination among the growing body of
regulatory commissions, market entities and other state
agencies involved in energy.
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Let’s Talk it Over
More than anything else, California needs to decide
exactly what kind of electric power marketplace it
wants to have going into the future. To avoid doing so
for much longer risks the ad hoc imposition of policies
and institutional barriers that will be impossible to
untangle later on.
Paul Joskow, director of the Center for Energy and
Environmental Policy Research at the Massachusetts
Institute of Technology, sees a series of questions that
must be asked and answered before a new course of
action can be reasonably implemented.
“Going forward,” Joskow said, “California really has to
decide: Do you want to rely on competitive wholesale
markets? Do you want to rely on competitive retail
markets? Do you want to go back to a system of
regulated vertically integrated monopolies? Those are
really fundamental questions that California needs to
answer because I think you can’t just polish off bits
and pieces of the current system and expect it to work
without some basic decision about what the future
structure of the industry for California will be.”
Mark Bernstein, a senior policy analyst at the RAND
Corporation, agreed. “I would say we have to rethink
what we’re trying to achieve, and we have to figure out
what the goal is, and when we’ve decided what the goal
is, then we can set up the system to meet that goal. If
the goal is to have a functioning market for power in
this state, then we need to set up the system to achieve
that goal and set up a very different system than what
we did set up.”
“AB 1890 wasn’t a law,” reflects Robert Michaels,
professor of economics at California State University,
Fullerton, and an affiliate consultant with Tabors,
Caramanis & Associates. “AB 1890 was a settlement
agreement that fell apart partially through the self-
interested behavior of people and partially through this
year-long force of external events. You could not have
the equivalent of the [Steve Peace] ‘death march’ today.
There are too many interested parties. There are too
many people with financial exposures that they would
not risk in the Legislature, and you have federal and
out-of-state interests which have become compellingly
important.”
That sounds like a recipe for deadlock, but Michaels
believes it is necessary to break through the impasse.
“We can’t live like this forever. We can’t live with a
federal presence that we don’t understand the
implications of, and we can’t really go back. There is
nothing to go back to,” he concluded.
Building blocks for a functional market
Severin Borenstein, the director of the University of
California Energy Institute at UC Berkeley, sees the
great failure of California’s market less in what was
introduced than in what was neglected. “There were
two fundamental aspects to this that were ignored.
One is the demand side of the market, which was
completely left out, so that essentially we were
operating a market where all of the adjustment had to
occur on the supply side,” he said. “On the other side,
the supply side, we threw everything into the spot
market that wasn’t contracted beforehand. We have to
understand that for this market to work, we really need
to have demand-side responsiveness and we need to
have long-term contracting ability.”
Included in Borenstein’s vision for demand-side
response is not only a greater use of real-time meters to
provide the kinds of price signals that energy users will
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respond to, but also a restoration of the direct-access
option—at least for larger customers that are better
equipped to control their own energy choices than
residential or small commercial customers.
Holding direct access hostage to the state’s need to pay
off the apparently high-priced power contracts signed
by the Department of Water Resources would be a
mistake, he suggested. Instead, the economist
recommends seeing the contracts for what they are:
financial liabilities. “We could pay for them by
recognizing that there is this loss associated with these
contracts, and that we can recover that loss by telling
each participant, ‘Here’s your share of the loss . . . and
now you’re responsible for that bit of the contract.’“
Of course, he added, “We’re not going to do that at
the residential level, but we can certainly do that with
any customer who wants to go to direct access. If you
want to leave the system, you don’t just walk away, you
leave the system with your share of this contract
liability,” Borenstein said.
That stands in sharp contrast with the CPUC’s policy
to indefinitely suspend choice. “The most antiquated
1960s version of dealing with this is locking everybody
into the old utility system, raising flat rates because,
again, they’re not talking about allowing prices to vary
with wholesale or with shortages in the market, and
you’re just stuck here. It’s the innovation-destroying
way to deal with this problem,” Borenstein concluded.
Restoring direct access is not just a demand-side issue,
suggested RAND’s Bernstein, but is an integral
component of restoring a market for power sellers
beyond the state and utilities, while refining the state’s
role as market monitor and standards setter. “I think
we’ve got to get back to a point where we do create
some competition on the generation side. We do let
customers choose their provider at some level. And
that’s only going to happen if we get the real-time
pricing or time-of-day pricing. If we get better
information out there about how to change your
energy use and things like that—which I think the
state can do a really good job on and has a role in—
that’s basically where we should be.”
For some, especially Bill Marcus, principal economist
at JBS Energy who frequently consults for such
consumer advocate groups as The Utility Reform
Network and Utility Consumers’ Action Network,
direct-access availability might be restored on a
core/non-core basis as long as those leaving the system
cannot escape liabilities.
But Marcus believes there needs to be a much more
active effort to bring down the costs entailed in those
contracts. “We’ve got to try to do something to
renegotiate some of those DWR contracts,” Marcus
said with increasing frustration at the inability of the
governor to reach agreement with the suppliers.
“I think the focus needs to be on quantity and
flexibility rather than price because the worst thing
they did with those contracts was to essentially convert
gas-fired resources, which are inherently flexible, into
24/7 and 6 x 16 must-take contracts. Essentially, they
stood principles of resource planning on their head,
made the gas-fired resources inflexible and as a result
said, ‘Now we have no room for renewables.’“ He
added, “That’s got to be reversed if the state is ever
going to do anything reasonable out in the future. My
view is pay them [suppliers] a little bit of money and
throw them out. Reach a settlement. It’s cheaper than
taking the power.”
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The entire debate over whether the DWR contracts are
“huge losers” or the way that California “tamed the
runaway market” is muddled by the fact that the
wholesale power market currently does not offer a very
good indicator for price transparency. When the Power
Exchange went out of business, it took away the main
pricing rudder—as controversial as it was, given the
state of the market at the time. 
But even with private pricing surveys or market
indexes carried in various trade publications, people
must realize that current wholesale trading is very thin,
and price indicators going out into the future are
unstable and unreliable. Robert McCullough, a
Northwest economist and energy consultant, suggests
that given the low volume on power futures, almost
anyone could manipulate the prices to their
advantage—and he cited Enron as a distinct example.
So that means the most important missing piece is the
mechanism for establishing price benchmarks—not
only as a check against utility purchases (when they
return to that function) and a measure of what it
might take to buy out uneconomic liabilities, but also
to serve as a guideline for determining whether the
state’s emergency response was a major mistake or just
a correctable miscalculation. Currently, that is a matter
of vehement conjecture—but only conjecture because
in the long run things could look very differently.
There is little chance of restoring the Power Exchange.
But Cal-ISO intends to create a more functional day-
ahead market that can serve as the basis for price
transparency today and into the future. Whether that
redesign can be put into place in a timely manner is
uncertain, however.
Frank Wolak, the Stanford economist who chairs the
Cal-ISO market surveillance committee, sees that as a
legitimate role for Cal-ISO, as long as it is not
expected to “solve” the problems its systems may
reveal. That means the ISO’s current proposal to secure
capacity might not fit well with its recommended role.
“The ISO should be effectively just a black box
through which signals get transmitted,” Wolak said.
“So, for example, we’re short of power, how do we
solve that problem? We don’t solve that problem by the
ISO going out and buying the stuff; we solve the
problem by saying, ‘Look, we’re raising the price of
power right now and if you’d like to supply, come
supply.’” The same price signal will also trigger
demand responses when needed, he said.
“So a lot of it is simply avoiding the tendency to be
arbitrary and intervene in the market and use the
signals that are already available in the tariff to
effectively make this system stay balanced.” That is
difficult, he acknowledged, because neither engineers
nor regulators have much faith that markets can
provide appropriate signals.
As the noted business historian John Steele Gordon
has accurately observed, “Self-enforcing laws are in
everyone’s interest except for one group, the people
who make and enforce the laws to begin with. Those
who work for government—legislators and bureaucrats
alike—prefer to manage problems rather than solve
them.”
The Future Challenge
So that is the challenge for California, to find ways to
solve the problems raised by the electricity market
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failure—not just manage them by creating costly policies
and hurdles that will outlive the problem by decades.
As I said, consensus is elusive, but there are workable
ideas that can be pulled together into a new plan for
recreating a more workable power marketplace:
• Avoid arbitrary interventions in markets and be
wary of long-term state involvement in purchasing
and/or constructing supplies.
• Restore customer choice for those willing to pay
for the privilege.
• Build demand-responsiveness into the system 
with new technologies and harness price changes,
rather than trying to completely “protect” 
consumers.
• Negotiate in good faith—not strong-arm—the
DWR power contracts.
But most importantly, California’s leaders and market
participants must consciously decide which path to
pursue. Paul Joskow said California’s failure is not a
general indictment of restructuring, which has evolved
in England and in other parts of this nation. “I think
they should look around the country and around the
world to see what others have achieved from various
kinds of reforms.”
Arthur O’Donnell is editor and associate publisher of
the California Energy Markets newsletter, based in San
Francisco. A version of this article originally appeared
in CEM (Issue No. 653, January 25, 2002). This
project was funded by the Energy Foundation with the
support of the Hewlett Foundation.
10
11
Mark A. Bernstein is a RAND senior
policy analyst specializing in energy and
environmental issues. His work focuses on
the role of technology innovation in reducing
greenhouse gas emissions, scenarios for electric power
in developing countries, and the role of energy
efficiency in economic productivity. Prior to RAND,
Mark served as senior energy policy analyst for the
White House Office of Science and Technology Policy
Severin Borenstein, Director,
University of California Energy Institute
and Professor of Business, Economic
Analysis and Policy Group (Haas School of Business,
University of California at Berkeley.
S. David Freeman, Chair of the
California Consumer Power and
Conservation Financing Authority, is a long-
time public-power executive who formerly served as
the head of the Los Angeles Water & Power
Department, the Sacramento Municipal Utility
District, the New York Power Authority, the Lower
Colorado River Authority and the Tennessee Valley
Authority. 
Paul L. Joskow is the Killian Professor
of Economics and Management and director
of the Center for Energy and Environmental Policy
Research at Massachusetts Institute of Technology.
William B. Marcus is principal
economist for JBS Energy, West
Sacramento, who frequently provides expert
analysis and testimony on energy and regulatory
matters on behalf of consumer advocacy groups in
California.
Robert J. Michaels is Professor of
Economics at California State University,
Fullerton; and adjunct scholar of the Cato
Institute. He is also a consultant with Tabors
Caramanis.
Frank A. Wolak, Professor in the
Department of Economics at Stanford
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B I O G R A P H I E S O F I N T E R V I E W E E S
QWhen AB 1890 and California PublicUtilities Commission policies were put intoeffect in the 1996 period, a number of new
ideas, new market structures, new entities were set up.
And yet in the past year and a half many of those have
either failed, proven to be false assumptions about how
the market might work, or were under-mined by the
legislative response or even regulatory response to it. In
your view, having now a 20-year perspective on
restructuring, what of that effort is worth trying to
preserve as we go into the future?
MARK BERNSTEIN: I really think that in the long
run, retail choice has got to come back. I think that we
would have a better overall, a healthier electric system
if we work it out so people can choose.  But it has to
be carefully structured.  We have to have the proper
information and the proper mechanisms for that to
work. And that’s only going to happen if we get the
real-time pricing or time-of-day pricing.  If we get
better information out there about how to change your
energy use and things like that, which I think the state
can really do a good job on, and has a role in, and
that’s basically where we should be.  Hopefully.
QHow do you feel about what Californianshave done during the past summer? Wehave documented evidence that even on an
actual metered basis we have significant reductions
during the summer period and peak-load reductions
compared to last year, although that may not be the
best basis point. Is this something that is sustainable?
BERNSTEIN: I’m a little skeptical about the numbers
that the California Energy Commission’s coming out
with.  I think they generally do a good job, but I think
they may overstate the impact of the efficiency
programs.  I think they may be overstating how much
demand would have been expected given how slow the
economy moved.  So, I think there has been some
reduction due to the efficiency programs and price
rises, but I don’t think it’s as high as what’s out there,
that 10-to-15 percent number.  
Is it sustainable? We’re going to have to wait and see.
How much of it is conservation which is people
turning off lights, which won’t be sustainable because
people will forget, go back to their old ways, or
turning down thermostats.  And how much is
efficiency, how much is people putting in fluorescents,
buying new appliances, commercial buildings changing
operations, things like that.  A year from now we’ll
have to look and see how it’s going.  
QWe talked about what should be preserved,but what is beyond salvage?  What  shouldwe leave behind as a bad experiment and
not even try to incorporate into the future?
BERNSTEIN: It wasn’t really things that were done
that failed, it’s things that weren’t done and failed at
some level. You had to have this confluence of events
that people categorize as the “perfect storm” to make it
as bad as it was.  You made too many restrictions on
the market, you didn’t allow utilities to enter bilateral
agreements, you froze rates, you had a drought, you
had a pipeline explosion.  
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Senior policy analyst at RAND Corporation.
December 6, 2001
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And you had people waiting too long to take action,
too, because the signs were there the summer before,
or at least into the fall before and things should have
started moving then. I would say we have to re-think
what we’re trying to achieve and we have to figure out
what the goal is and when we’ve decided what the goal
is, then we can set up the system to meet that goal.  If
the goal is to be able to have a functioning market for
power in this state, then we need to set up the system
to achieve that goal and that would set up a very
different system than what we did set up.  
It’s almost starting from scratch, and we have time to
do it. We could figure out how to make the markets
work, how to make sure that somebody’s watching out
so that we don’t get into the stress situations, who’s
responsible for that, and how to make that work.  And
let’s strategically plan this thing.  So it’s not a simple
answer, and I don’t have that simple answer because I
think there needs to be some work before we get to
that answer.
QDo you think the state’s ready to listen tothat advice now a year later?
BERNSTEIN: I don’t know.  There are too many
people who think they know what the answer is right
now, and I’m one of the people who’s saying I don’t
think we know what the answer is because I think there’s
a lot of analysis that hasn’t yet been done to figure out
what the answer is. There are too many people in
power that think they know exactly how to solve the
problem already.  And I think they’re wrong, and I
think they don’t know.  I don’t think anybody knows. 
QOne of the answers that I know at least acouple of prominent regulators feel is toreturn to regulation, return to command
and control, have utilities be the agents of state action,
tell them what to do, control the prices.  Is there
something of that “good old days” history that really is
worth preserving and worth bringing into the future
that can work with a competitive market?
BERNSTEIN: Well, the transmission/ distribution
system was always still going to be regulated.  In terms
of the old vertically integrated utilities, there’s no in-
between.  You either go back to a vertically integrated
utility that has a better regulatory structure, because
there are better ways to set up regulation.  We didn’t
have to go to the restructured route.  We could have
improved the regulation.  So you’ve either got to do
that or you’ve got to have a marketplace on the
generation side.  I don’t think there’s any in-between,
and I don’t think we can go back.
QThe legislation that enacted the PowerAuthority gave it almost no limits.  The onlylimit was a suggestion of a $5 billion bonding
authority, but beyond that it could choose its own
employees outside of Civil Service rules, have the powers
of eminent domain, have the power to do any kind of
contracting to take over projects, to actually envision
being the owner of long-term contracts even though
there was only a five or six year sunset on this agency. 
BERNSTEIN: Which makes no sense.  We were trying
to look at the New York Power Authority as a model,
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and there were limits to what they can do.  I really
thought there needs to be more definition and there’s
still time to do that.  You can add legislation that
better defines this agency.  I think a five-year sunset is
silly when we’re talking about energy, which is a long-
term investment. You’re trying to make long-term
investments, you can’t have a five-year sunset.  So that
doesn’t make any sense.  
On the other hand, giving free rein to the organization
to do anything it wants doesn’t make any sense either.
One of the things that was lacking in California as well
as the nation—and what we advised to Congress—was
there’s nobody responsible for looking at the
infrastructure and providing early-warning notices that
we’re getting into a supply constrained situation,
whether it be generation, or transmission, or
distribution.
There needs to be some fundamental role for watching
the system, and I think the Power Authority could do
that.  So that’s one important role I think for them, is
to do long-term planning.  Not planning, but long-
term analysis and make sure that what we have in the
hands of the private sector is going to meet the needs
in that the transmission and distribution system is
keeping up and the links to the natural gas issues are
being dealt with, and we’re dealing with drought
potential things.
I also think the energy efficiency side of it is a proper
role for the state to take.  I don’t think the utilities do
it that well.  I think they do okay, but that’s not their
core mission.  Their core mission is to sell electricity
and the less they sell, the less revenues they make, the
less return they get.  So take that out of the hands of
the utilities and put it in the hands of a different
institution.
QMaybe you see this as a role that the PowerAuthority could fill?
BERNSTEIN: Yeah.  And it makes sense for the Power
Authority to fill that.  Let’s step back at the issue of
what should [be preserved].  It occurred to me what I
think needs to be preserved and one of the things that
needs to be preserved is the PUC’s right of regulation…
QDefine that for us.
BERNSTEIN: Price regulation at the retail level.  One
of the things that has been both in the PG&E
bankruptcy, and the Department of Water Resources
wants to take that out of the hands of the PUC, and
not that I think that PUC’s necessarily done a good
job, but I would not want to take that away from the
people’s right to have a voice in this.  And the minute
you take it out of the PUC then you lose all other
voice and I think that’s a big mistake.  I think there
needs to be some oversight by an agency that is
independent of the Governor. 
QWhat haven’t we talked about that youthink is vitally important.
BERNSTEIN: Natural gas.  While we’re also worried
about the electric system, I continue to be worried
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about the natural gas system.  Demand for gas is going
to soar once the economy starts coming back on line
and nobody is seriously looking at how we move the
gas to where it’s needed when it’s needed.
Fundamentally we’re changing the demand pattern for
natural gas. Traditionally natural gas peaks in the
wintertime.  Well, last year it peaked in the summer.
Summer peak was higher than the winter peak.  But
the system is not set up to meet the winter peak.  It’s
set up to store in the summertime, spring and summer,
to have enough to make up the difference in the
distribution capacity for the wintertime.  Well, if
you’re using it in the summer at a higher peak, you
fundamentally change the system.  And nobody’s
thinking of that.  
I worry about all these plants coming on line, many of
them in PG&E territory to begin with, are they going
to be able to do the upgrades needed to get them?  And
then you’ve got this huge growth and demand through-
out the West, and I’m not sure we can meet that.
QOut of the restructuring regime that camefrom AB 1890, and the California PublicUtilities Commission’s policies, is there
anything worth trying to preserve?
SEVERIN BORENSTEIN: I would say almost
everything is worth trying to preserve.  It’s not that
what was there was broken, it’s that not enough was
there.  There were just two fundamental aspects to this
that were ignored.  One is the demand side of the
market which was completely left out.  We basically
ignored it.  
And on the other side, on the supply side, we threw
everything into the spot market that wasn’t already
contracted beforehand.  And one of the problems with
that, of course, is that when the price went up, we
were exposed to it on a much larger scale than should
have occurred. And the other part, which also feeds
back to the demand side is that both the lack of long-
term contracting and the lack of demand
responsiveness were just set-ups for suppliers to be able
to exercise extreme market power.  
We have to understand that for this market to work,
for an electricity market to work as a market—and I
would argue that there is no electricity market in the
world that’s actually working as a market right now—
that we really need to have demand-side
responsiveness and we need to have long-term
contracting ability.
QThat implies that direct access ought to be aviable component with this and yet directaccess has been held hostage to emergency
response.  So how do we restore direct access and take
care of the state’s financial problem?
BORENSTEIN: This is the fundamental mis-
understanding in the state right now, that direct access
is a problem for dealing with the long-term contracts
that the state has signed.  The state has signed X
billion dollars in long-term contracts; it’s some big
number.  Those contracts are now very big losers.
Huge losers.  So the state is stuck with this liability.  
Somehow they have to recover enough money to pay
for these contracts.  Now there are many ways you
could do that. We could pay for them through the
California taxpayers.  I don’t think we should, but
that’s one way we could do it.  We could pay for them
by locking everybody into a utility system, raising rates
and forcing everybody to pay the high rates and
skimming the extra off and paying these stranded
investments—which is what these are.  That’s what the
CPUC proposes to do.  
Or, we could pay for them by recognizing that there is
this loss associated with these contracts, and that we
can recover that loss by telling each participant, here’s
your share of the loss and you can pay for it through
any number of ways.  So, for instance, we could do the
calculation, well over the next 10 years we’re buying X
amount of power each hour.
Now, we’re not going to do that at the residential level,
but we can certainly do that with any customer who
wants to go direct access.  If you want to leave the
system, you don’t just walk away, you leave the system
with your share of this contract liability.  On the other
hand, make us an offer.  You could also come to a state
and say you want us to walk away with this contract,
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here, we’ll just give you right now $2.5 million—or
whatever the number is—to buy out our share of the
liability. 
These are financial liabilities, they can be traded as
financial liabilities.  The most antiquated 1960’s
version of dealing with this is locking everybody into
the old utility system, raising flat rates because, again,
they’re not talking about actually allowing prices to
vary with wholesale or with shortages in the market,
and just saying you’re stuck here. It is the innovation-
destroying way to deal with this problem.
QYou express an interesting in bringing backa Power Exchange.  That’s kind of unlikely,but there was a value to the Power Exchange
in that it provided a transparent price that people
could possibly do something with if we ever got to that
point. 
BORENSTEIN: We don’t need a Power Exchange,
and I have no interest in bring back the Power
Exchange per se although I’m on the board.  I would
actually rather it went away so I could get off that job.  
But you could run a day-ahead market with a
transparent price through the ISO, and I think the
arguments for keeping them separate have been shown
to be pretty bogus and you might as well just put it in
the ISO and right there.  Yes, you do need to have
some sort of a transparent price to run lots of
contracts. 
One of the things you need a price for is real-time
pricing of electricity, which ties back to the issue of
demand responsiveness.  There are a lot of ways to do
demand responsiveness from the bluntest of blunt
instruments that says if it gets bad we can come and
shut your power down, to the most refined, which says
hour by hour you get charged or minute by minute you
get charged a different price.  Probably hour by hour.  
Customers would then have the incentives when prices
go through the roof, that is either when demand is
incredibly high or for some reason you have a shortage
on the supply side—or both—to cut back.  
Right now we don’t have any mechanism that does
that.  One of the dirty secrets from the summer of
2001 is that…well, it is well-known we got lucky on
the weather.  What’s not as well known is if we hadn’t
gotten lucky we had no back-up.  We had no
interruptibles, almost no interruptible supply or
interruptible demand, and all of the other programs . .
. although the programs were initiated, they had
almost nobody signed up for them.  If we had really
gotten into trouble and gone to the cupboard looking
for demand response, we would have found that there
wasn’t much there.
QOf the restructuring package, you said thatmost of it could be preserved, but what partof it shouldn’t be?  What should we
abandon?  What should we give up as a bad idea?
BORENSTEIN: The rate freeze combined with the
lack of long-term contracts.  The rate freeze would
have been fine if the utilities could have gone out and
signed long-term contracts because had they known
that they could cover them. They were unwilling to do
it on their own dime, but had they known that they
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would be allowed to go out and sign a four-cent
[per/KWh] contract for the next four years, I suspect
they would have done that. And then even though the
spot price would have gone through the roof, they
wouldn’t have been paying it on much.  
So, it was the deadly combination that was set up of
not having long-term contracts and at the same time
having a fixed retail price that really caused this crisis,
and it was all exacerbated by the fact that the wholesale
price was not a competitive price, that the sellers
figured out they could make more money by selling
less power.
I don’t view that as a crime, certainly not an antitrust
violation in the way I think they were doing it, which
was not collusively but individually.  It probably was
an action that merited response by the FERC sooner
than they did respond. 
QWe have seen positive effects of the movetowards conservation and some efficiencyinstallations over the past year. Do you
think they’re sustainable?
BORENSTEIN: No, I don’t think they’re sustainable if
we don’t have a pricing mechanism that ultimately
gives people the right incentives.  I think that if you
look at summer 2001 we had a tremendous response.
Some of it was price driven, that is some of it was
driven by the 20/20 Program, some of it was driven by
the rate increases, even the residential rate increases,
which were very small primarily because residential
consumers thought they were much larger than they
actually were.  
But some of it was also driven by good citizenship and
by pleas from the Governor and other people to
conserve and by rebates for new appliances and things
like that.  
Ultimately we’re not going to have a 20/20 plan every
summer – I hope.  Ultimately we’re not going to heat
up public spiritness so that every year people will
conserve in the summer.  You know they’re just not
going to.  You can’t maintain that sort of spirit.
Ultimately we have to have a price system that says it
costs a lot to run an air conditioner on a really hot
summer afternoon so maybe you should try to put a
tree up that will shade your house so on that hottest
summer afternoon you’re not cranking it quite as
much.  But I think to do that ultimately we need to
have pricing signals that people understand will kick in
on those hot days.  And again, we’re not going to do it
at the residential level next year, but we could certainly
do it at the commercial industrial level next year.
QYou don’t see much of a need for the PowerAuthority, you don’t see much of a positiverole for it, so let’s explore that.  Is there
something that the Power Authority could be doing
that would be valuable now, or into the long term, and
what is it doing that maybe it shouldn’t be doing?
BORENSTEIN: It’s hard to know what the California
Power Authority should be doing because there are so
many other energy commissions, administrations,
bureaucracies in the state. 
One idea when the CPA was first discussed was that it
would be the umbrella organization, and the ISO
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would be under it, and the CEC would be under it, or
at least the [generation] siting part of the CEC.  I
could see that as making sense as a Power Authority
being sort of the umbrella organization.  
What the CPA should not be doing—quite clearly—is
building power plants. There is this notion out there,
which the Power Authority is one of the advocates of,
that the state must have an X percent reserve in order
to assure a competitive market.  Well the X is not a
number that you can calculate, despite the recent ISO
study that was sort of forced to come up with some
number.  You don’t need any reserve or almost no
reserve if you have enough price responsiveness on the
demand side.  Because if you get short, the price goes
up, people will conserve and it will send signals to
invest.  
I think that there is real argument for government
sponsorship of research and development on efficiency
programs and on renewables.  By the way I think there
also is real argument for sponsorship of government
support of R&D on nuclear power too.  That is, these
are technology investigations that would have huge
spillovers when they paid off, and that’s the sort of the
thing the government should be supporting.  
But the idea that the state is going to systematically,
rather than send the right price signals, subsidize
people to do what we think is the right thing in their
individual house, is really a huge step away from sort
of the capitalist system where people make decisions
about how to spend their money to make themselves
well off; in a way that makes me very uncomfortable.
I would much rather see a system that develops the
technologies, informs people about the technologies
and then lets them decide when they’re going to use it.  
QLet’s talk about the price caps. Is there acontinuing role for something like whatpeople call a “circuit breaker,” an overall cap?
BORENSTEIN: Yes.  I think until we have very
serious and widespread real-time pricing of electricity
at retail, we’re going to always have price caps.  I think
we’ve got to have a price cap, maybe it should be
much, much higher. 
By the time the FERC finally came around the market
had “fixed” itself.  The market hadn’t fixed itself.
Enough things had happened that that the price caps
didn’t really have much effect.  Whether you like or
hate the long-term contracts, part of what brought
prices down was the long-term contracts; the incentive
to exercise market power was greatly diminished.  It
might not have been worth it given how much we paid
but it certainly greatly diminished the spot price.  The
biggest thing, of course, was the price of natural gas
came in-line, which greatly lowered the price of
electricity, and we got very lucky with the weather.
QNow you have testified in a number offorums about real-time pricing and gettingthe meters there and doing this. If that were
our first priority, how would we go about doing it?
Should it be the PUC ordering these?
BORENSTEIN: The meters are in, or are almost are
in now.  We could put in more and you could have the
state pay for it, or you could rate base it.  
We’re just not talking about that much money here,
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we’re talking about tens of millions, $10 or $20
million dollars, we’re not talking about $100 million
or like the amount we were spending every day on
electricity in the spring.  But the PUC has to actually
implement a real-time pricing rate and the PUC is
unwilling to do that.  Loretta Lynch has made it quite
clear that this is not something she’s going to support,
and I think until she changes her mind or somebody
else is running the commission or there’s some way to
do this around the commission, which the only way
would be to revive direct access, which they’re also not
going to support, I don’t see how this moves forward. 
QOkay so we’re going to be stuck in a limbofor an indefinite period of time?
BORENSTEIN: And I don’t understand the politics
well enough to know how much the Governor can
pressure the PUC, or how much the Legislature can
maybe override the PUC. But maybe from my sort of
distant and naïve political viewpoint, it sure looks like
it’s just stuck right now.  I wish I were more optimistic.
QWhat’s your immediate goal?
FREEMAN: It would seem logical that we would try
to make a contribution to supply and demand as
quickly as we prudently can.  After all, the agency was
born out of this crisis and I guess if you want to put a
label on it, we’re the “Never Again” crowd.  Our job is
to try to assure as best we can that never again are we
plagued with threats of black-outs or price spikes of a
kind that we had in the past.
We are not another government agency that feels
proud of just shuffling paper.  We are in the tradition
of agencies like the Tennessee Valley Authority and the
New York Power Authority, and Bonneville and others.
I happen to know something about the history of
TVA.  It was enacted in May of 1933 and they were
building Norris Dam in August.  Got it built in 13
months.  Put people to work.
QLet me ask you this, because you’re asfamiliar as anybody with the way the marketwas structured here. Obviously we saw that
a lot of the elements that we thought were going to be
good things have gone away.  The Power Exchange,
direct access, a whole sense of trust in choice and the
retail players.  What part of restructuring is worth
trying to preserve?
FREEMAN: I think that it is possible for the bulk of
the baseload, round-the-clock power to be supplied by
private companies, putting their money, investing their
money in California and to be satisfactory—provided
it’s supplemented by something like the Power
Authority that will assure they don’t put us back on
short rations.
QSo we’re talking about the wholesale markethere?
FREEMAN: That’s right.  As far as the retail market is
concerned, all we got was a bill of goods as far as
Green Power and direct access.  The bulk of the people
in California never really had a shot at lower priced
electricity from someone else, or much of a shot at
Green Power.  I had more Green Power customers in
Los Angeles, where we had a bigger program than the
rest of the state put together and we did that without
the benefit of AB 1890 or any state intervention at all.
We did it because we believed in it.  
Now I think most consumers of electricity would like
to go back to the good old days where all they had to
do was to pay a bill once a month that was modest in
size and didn’t have to read about this stuff in the
paper all the time
Now sure, everyone would like to see the rates come
down somewhat and that may happen in the future,
but we’ve got to get this bond issue done, and we have
to add constantly to our capacity and have it in the
hands of people that will dispatch it when it’s needed.
And we have to keep conservation constant and we
need to switch to renewables.
I think that the electric power industry probably needs
to recognize that there is a whole new era ahead of us
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called decentralized power that will be the wave of the
future.  And if anything is going to make that
unmistakably clear I think it was the tragedy of
September 11th.  It reveals that everything that is
distant and remote is vulnerable, and I believe people
are more and more going to want to have their solar
collectors and their fuel cells and their micro turbines.  
I’ve been saying this for quite awhile, but I believe that
central station, big power, is peaked out.  It’s not going
away, but we are probably seeing the last decade of that
era and the beginnings of a decentralized power world.
QThis agency has a rather open-endedauthority.  I’ve read the legislation and itlooks like it’s pretty much whatever you
decide to create it to be. One of the big questions
that’s in a lot of people’s minds is, is this a five-year
institution, or is this a long-term institution?
FREEMAN: We’ve got to prove our worth.  Obviously,
as a new guy on the block, and unless we can show that
we’re doing something for the consumer, that we are in
fact helping to keep the lights on and the rates down and
the power supply cleaner, our tenure will be a short five
years.  If we’re serving the public interest, it will be
continued, so I think the burden of proof is on us, and
we’re going to see if we can rise up to it.
We don’t feel that we are preordained, that we have some
sort of a right to a future existence, I think we have to earn
it.  That’s my attitude and I think the attitude of the
board.  I think that we’re given plenty of opportunity to
prove our worth, but the fact that we might own a
peaking plant doesn’t mean that it can’t be sold to the
respective utility in a couple of years, or in four or five
years.  The agencies may die, but power plants don’t.  Not
very quickly.
QAside from working with the existingregulatory agencies, there are a number ofstate entities, like the Department of
General Services, that could be really good partners for
you.  How are you working with them?
FREEMAN: We’re trying to get in cahoots with them.
The whole idea of our acquiring solar and fuel cells is
to install them in state buildings and try to acquire
them at a price where just the electric bills that are not
being paid would finance them.  And so we’re working
as closely as we can—that may not be closely
enough—but they are our partner, as is the
Department of Water Resources, which may buy the
output in the future. When the [California
Independent System Operator] becomes creditworthy,
they may acquire some of our peaking power.
QA lot of people are looking at your agencyto be the place where they can finally selltheir renewable power, where they can
finally bring the ideas that they’ve been trying to pitch
and get into the state portfolio for a long time.  Let’s
talk about renewables.
FREEMAN: And we’re ready, willing and able to help
them but they must realize that we have go to sell that
electricity to somebody, and that somebody right now
is the Department of Water Resources. 
QOne of the elements of the photovoltaicssolicitation that you had was that not onlywould the state buy from these
manufactures of the module, component makers, but
also they would have to make it available to the general
public at the same prices. 
FREEMAN: We want to create a large solar power
presence in California.  We want to stop talking about
megawatts and be talking about hundreds and
thousands of megawatts.  There’s no reason why
California should not get up there in the league with
Germany and Japan and have at least hundreds of
megawatts of solar and we’re just trying to get us out
of the cottage-industry phase into larger size plants and
so we’re offering to buy 20 MW a year if they will
agree to at least offer that kind of volume to the public
at roughly the same price.  
We’ve got to get the price down and I think the
market is potentially out there, but no one is
marketing a product that is anywhere near economic,
and we’re trying to get there.  We know there are
economies of scale and we’re trying to achieve them.
And I think it can work.
QSomething else that’s gotten a lot ofdiscussion in your meetings is a return tointegrated resource planning, and I want to
talk about that with you because right across the street
here is the agency [the California Energy Commission]
that used to do that kind of thing.  Is that going to
happen here, is it going to happen over there?  Where
should it happen?
FREEMAN: We formed a team, we’re going to work
together.  We’ve got the California Energy
Commission already actively involved in putting
together the basic data.  We got the PUC involved,
and we’re getting some help from the ISO and the
statute requires us to take the lead and we’re going
after it.  
It’s a new challenge in that no one has tried to
integrate the workings of the government and the
marketplace into a coherent plan and we’re going to be
working on scenarios to maximize reliability and
security, to minimize price, to maximize cleaner air
and then harmonize the scenarios into a plan.  It’s not
going to be easy because there is conflict inherent
between some of the objectives that we all subscribe to.
Everybody wants the lowest possible price, the cleanest
possible energy and the most secure and reliable.  Well,
we have to kind of look at those in a scenario sense
and then see if we can fit them together.  It may be
some contradiction but maybe not.  Maybe we can get
the price of renewables down low enough to where it
will be low-cost as well as cleanest and most reliable.
We’ll see.
QGiven everything that’s happened inCalifornia and in our neighboring states, doyou think that we can rehabilitate a
competitive energy market, or is time to redefine the
goal and come up with something else.
FREEMAN: I guess what I’m talking about and what
the state has embarked on is a hybrid.  It’s a market
where we are counting on competition to supply the
bulk of the power but we’re not just relying on them
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and that we have not forgotten what happened to us.
And so we have the Power Authority which has to have
a five-year plan and to have enough ready reserves so
that if the market tries to keep us short, we stay long.  
In other words, to achieve a surplus and keep it
regardless of how much is invested in California.  And
I think if we can maintain a surplus of 15 percent
reserve, than I think the market can function pretty
well and we can have our cake and eat it.  I think it’s
impractical to try to buy back all the power plants that
were sold and it certainly would be stupid and foolish
to go back to a pure deregulation mode where we have
been.  Ripped off once, shame on them, but ripped off
twice, it’s shame on us.
QMany of the tenets of restructuring asembodied in AB 1890 and subsequentCalifornia Public Utilities Commission
policies have either failed, been proven false
assumptions or in other ways turned out to be
different than what we expected going into it.  So,
looking at it now, what do you think might be worth
trying to preserve as we move forward?
JOSKOW: I think it’s important to decide to start
with what kind of electric power system, what kind of
an industrial organization for its electric industry
California really wants.  I think one of the many
reasons California went wrong is that it took what I
call a Chinese menu approach to restructuring.  It took
a little bit from what one group was proposing, a little
bit from what another group was proposing and a little
bit from what a third, fourth and fifth group were
proposing and put them all together into a system that
was internally inconsistent.  
Going forward, California really has to decide: Do you
want to rely on competitive wholesale markets?  Do
you want to rely on competitive retail markets?  Do
you want to go back to a system of regulated vertically
integrated monopolies?  Those are really the
fundamental questions that California needs to answer,
because I think you can’t just polish off bits and pieces
of the current system and expect it to work without
some basic decision about what the future structure of
the industry for California will be.  The goals in
California have been pretty consistent over time—of
trying to provide reliable and economical supplies of
electricity consistent with promoting environmental
protection and energy conservation and I don’t see why
those goals are likely to change.  I think the real
question is whether California wants to revisit what
the best way is for achieving those goals.
QIf I can find an area of consensus right nowit’s that most of the economists would like tosee direct access or customer choice restored. 
JOSKOW: Well, again, I think the statement that
people want customer choice restored sooner rather
than later is the wrong way of looking at this.  I think
you have to take a holistic approach of what kind of a
system you really want going forward.  One of the key
questions to ask is: What kind of a retail environment
do you want to have and what is the associated
procurement program that goes along with that?
You can have a system where the incumbent
distribution utility serves all customers.  At the same
time you could still have competitive wholesale
markets where it buys power.  Another option would
be to have a core and non-core system, where the
incumbent distribution company has responsibility for
procuring power for residential and small commercial
customers.  Again, it could do it through competitive
procurement in a wholesale market, while larger
customers have the option of going out and finding
their own power supplier.  And a third option is to go
back to where we were and give everyone choice.  
I think the lessons from other jurisdictions so far are
that customer choice has worked most effectively in
terms of real economic benefits for the largest
customers.  For residential customers it’s basically been
a failure everywhere in the sense that very few
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customers have taken advantage of it, the customers
that did have gotten dumped back on their local utility
when wholesale markets exploded, and very few value-
added services are being provided to residential
customers and small commercial customers compared
to the energy services that are being provided to larger
customers.  
If you look around the world, in England they now
have a system in which everybody has direct-access
customer choice, but it took them 10 years to get
there, and residential customers were not put into the
system until they already had a fairly vibrant
competitive retail market for large customers and
where they have, eight or nine competing retailers who
are actively providing all customers with electricity and
natural gas service.  
So along that spectrum California needs to make a
choice.  One of the key decisions it needs to make is, if
it really wants to go to customer choice and it’s going
to work, it’s got to really deregulate that market.  It
can’t mix regulated default service prices with
unregulated markets.  It’s just not going to work.  
And now California still has to resolve who’s going to
pay for all those contracts that CDWR [Department of
Water Resources] has signed and the state is obligated
to.  And I know that a lot of proponents of customer
choice think that if you leave the system you won’t end
up paying for that.  Well, someone’s going to pay for
the costs of those contracts.  The state’s going to pay
for it through taxes or the electricity consumers are
going to pay for it in their electric rates or both. Since
consumers are taxpayers, in the end the consumer
pays.
QWe do have some voices on the CaliforniaPublic Utilities Commission that want avery traditional regulated system, back to
the old ways of doing it. 
JOSKOW: It’s not so easy to get back to the old way
of doing it because they’ve divested the generating
plants.  The utilities are still effectively insolvent.  They
haven’t solved that problem yet.  It sounds to me that
[Pacific Gas & Electric] has given up on the state and
is basically trying to put as many of its assets as it can
under federal jurisdiction.  It’s not clear to me they’re
going to be willing to make investments under a
California regulatory system, but that’s something that
needs to be resolved.
QRegardless of whether California decides togo back to a customer-choice regime, we dohave an overlay of wholesale restructuring.
Now we have assets that were predominantly used to
serve retail markets that are free to play in wholesale
markets, and the whole restructuring at that level,
which includes the Federal Energy Regulatory
Commission initiatives.  Can you talk about what’s
happening at the wholesale level and the interplay with
retail markets?
JOSKOW: Well, FERC clearly has a program for
trying to promote competitive wholesale markets and
the program has a number of features. FERC is also
trying to develop and to impose a set of basic
wholesale market design rules that would govern
congestion management, scheduling timing, the
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provision of ancillary services, operating reserves and
provide markets that can be used to balance supply
and demand in real time.  
So it’s basically trying to provide the wholesale market
platform upon which states can decide whether they’re
going to have customer choice, in which case
intermediaries—retailers, electricity service providers—
could link customers with wholesale markets. Or states
that choose not to have customer choice but where the
incumbent utility would be free to go out and buy
power in the wholesale market to serve the needs of it
regulated retail customers.  
I think FERC is facing a number of very significant
problems in doing this largely because the United
States has not gone about electricity restructuring the
right way across the country.  It’s very difficult to do
when you have so many transmission owners operating
control areas throughout the country.
And quite frankly it’s very difficult to do when you
have very different retail procurement regimes. Trying
to impose a set of good wholesale market rules that are
common so that suppliers in Virginia can in fact
deliver power that in some sense benefits New York, to
do that when every state has done a different thing in
terms of what the structure of the incumbent utilities
is, well, I think it is very, very challenging and very,
very difficult.
QDo you have any thoughts on the PowerAuthority—recognizing that you’re 3,000miles away and even the people who are
sitting in that office don’t know.
JOSKOW: I’ll tell you the thought I have is
California’s making it up as it goes along day after day,
and you can’t intelligently answer any of these
questions without a model, without a framework.
This is where the industry is going and here where all
the pieces fit and here’s what is going to be regulated,
here is not what’s going to be regulated and either here
is where I think the state fits in or I don’t.  They don’t
have a model that answers these questions. They’re just
making it up.  It’s just the worst example of industrial
policy I’ve ever seen in my life.
I’ve been challenging folks in California to come up
with that for the last year, and they’re not going to
have success unless they come up with it.  Now I
recognize they’ve been going from one crisis to the
next, but putting the financial side of this onto the
side for a moment, there was plenty of time in the last
six months for people to sit down and iron out what
the future’s going to look like.  And as usual in
California, they’ve been sitting and arguing instead
about exactly who’s going to pay how much of this
giant bill that they’ve run up, and I think it’s
unfortunate.  
In the end, the customers are paying a whole lot more
than they would have if California had done what
Massachusetts, Rhode Island and Maine did during the
summer of 2000.  They recognized there was a
problem.  They recognized that retail prices had to go
up and they let them go up and they took the political
heat.  And now they’re coming down.  Nobody’s got
10-year contracts at 2-times market value, and we’re
moving forward with restructuring and programs to
make competition work. 
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QCalifornia’s always had societal goals that getbuilt into the utility system—resourcediversity, energy efficiency. Should the state
continue to do that? Should we rely on the market to
do that? Can we rely on the market to do that?
JOSKOW: Again, I think people are approaching this
in the wrong way, as they have for many years.  I think
the first question is to ask why is it we want to have
any special conservation program or any program to
encourage renewable resources?  
We don’t have supermarkets telling people, or giving
people incentives to eat chicken rather than beef
because it’s healthy.
QThey just lower the prices if they want tomove chicken.
JOSKOW: Yeah, it’s up to them though.  And the
reasons are that in terms of renewable energy, people
think we really need to do something about air and
water pollution and CO2 emissions.  My view is the
best way to handle that is through regulations on the
emissions, but the way things have evolved is, one way
of handling it is, you sort of force electricity suppliers
to favor these kinds of green resources, for example.
I’ve never liked that.  I’d rather deal with the pollution
directly. 
Utility procurement to favor certain resources, and
some of the national bills have portfolio standards for
retailers.  I think the best way to do that is not to start
favoring particular technologies, it’s to have a menu of
technologies that satisfy some goal, to specify what the
goal is and then to provide incentives for supplies to go
out and try to achieve the goal as cheaply as possible.  
You’ve got to decide how much more you’re willing to
pay for these environmental benefits and then to have
a mechanism that basically allows the alternative
qualifying renewable energy options to bid for.  If you
give me a penny a kilowatt hour, I’ll give you a
thousand megawatts.  You beat someone who says I’ll
give you a thousand for two pennies a kilowatt hour.  
I think there are better ways of doing that.  But I think
we need to understand why it is we’re doing this.
Again, it’s a second- or third-best approach to pricing
pollution, which I think is the best way to do it.  To
tax pollution, to put a price on pollution through
requiring permits under a cap and trade system.
Conservation, again, also has an environmental
motivation, but it historically was based on the
assumption that electricity prices didn’t reflect all the
costs of producing electricity.  Well, now in California
electricity prices probably reflect 25 percent or 30
percent more than the full costs of producing
electricity, so that can no longer be the rationale for
conservation subsidies.  
QIs there any element of this that we haven’ttouched on? 
JOSKOW: I think one things we haven’t mentioned
but I think is obvious is California is not an island.
It’s part of the Western United States, and I think it’s
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going to be very important as this moves forward for
California and the rest of the states in the West to
come to some common understanding about what the
wholesale market platforms are going to be, how
they’re going to work with one another.  
I guess the other observation I’d make is it’s not clear
to me that the electricity competition program is ever
going to be successful without a much more aggressive
federal legislative program that really bites the bullet
on a lot of the issues involving structure, especially of
the network.  Having every state do its own thing on
an electric power network that spans large regions is
really not going to work very well, and I just see
continuing problems if we continue on this path.
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QThe purpose of this interview is to talkabout the future of California’s market, orpicking up the remains of what’s left of the
market and figuring out what to do about it. Where is
California’s market and what ought we do right away?
If anything.
BILL MARCUS: I think that we are clearly in a
transition stage.  We’re heading from the boom to the
bust, and we’re heading there fairly quickly with some
potential residual problems in the summer of 2002.  I
don’t think they’re likely to be that great, but if we
get a week of 110 degrees we could have a problem in
2002. 
We seem to be going back to “business as usual “again.
We seem to be going back to asking what kind of
discounts can we give interruptible industrial
customers for nothing, rather than for actually having
to do something.  We’re going back to “Let’s forget
about renewables because in the last crisis they didn’t
help us,” because we forgot about them before then.
We’re going back to de-emphasizing conservation.
We’re heading exactly in the same direction that we
were heading in the late 1980’s and again in the mid
90’s when we did this deregulation scheme in the
first place.  
If we don’t stop and do some things that are very
intentional and very clear, we may be heading toward a
repeat of the late 80’s and early 90’s, with power
surpluses and out-of-market contracts and out-of-
market power from various sources.
QWhat I’d like to ask you to do is to thinkabout the structures that were put in placewith AB 1890, the policy directions, and
tell me what of that you think is worth trying to
salvage?
BILL MARCUS: The difficulty with trying to salvage
it is that it was put together as a fairly clear ideological
response, and the ideology has proven itself not to
work very well. The whole ideology has proven itself to
be bankrupt.  
That said, we’re probably going to be in a place where
there is a competitive wholesale market and we need to
make that work.  I think that there may be some place
for direct access.  I think the stampede to direct access
in the last three months probably needs to be reversed
so that we start over in a more deliberate way, rather
than just say that those industrial guys who got out of
the barn get to stay out. 
We’ve got to try to do so something to renegotiate
some of these [Department of Water Resources]
contracts.  I think the focus probably needs to be on
quantity and flexibility rather than price, because the
worst thing they did with those contracts was to
essentially convert gas-fired resources, which are
inherently flexible, into 24/7 and 6x16 must-take
contracts. That’s got to be reversed if this state is ever
going to do anything reasonable out in the future. 
The major thing that needs to be changed is take-or-
pay.  In addition, we probably ought to be trying to
get rid of some megawatts both in the middle and at
the ends, in the 2003 to 2005 time frame when we’ve
got serious surplus, and also shortening up some
contracts if people are going to do that.  I think there
are some prices that are clearly unjust and unreasonable,
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but most of them are in the short-term phases of the
contracts.  
My view is pay them a little bit of money and throw
them out; reach a settlement, it’s cheaper than taking
the power.
QThe other big component of the stateresponse was to create a Power Authority.We have a relatively short-term emergency,
and yet we’re creating institutions that look for all the
world like they have a long-term mission, owning
power plants that last 30-40 years.  What’s your
thought about that and how that will impact whatever
we do about restoring a market?
BILL MARCUS: The Power Authority is well-
positioned to deal with renewables because renewables
are capital intensive and have financing issues.  They’re
at the place where the Power Authority’s low-cost
money can actually do some good.  
I also think that you’ve still got various levels of bias
and various problems in contracting with renewables
working through the existing utility structures.  I’m
not saying go out and build thousands of megawatts of
renewables tomorrow, because we’ve got a surplus. But
to bring something forward so the next time we have a
problem, we’ve actually done something that will cut
some of the top off of it. 
QWhile we’re on the topic of renewables, theEnergy Commission had a program ofsubsidizing existing plants, new production
and advanced technologies. While they’ve given out a
lot of awards to try and encourage construction, there’s
really no market there. How do we deal with that?
BILL MARCUS: Because there are no creditworthy
buyers.  When the utilities get credit worthy, they hate
renewables, that’s why you end up working with the Power
Authority structure and making the utilities buy them.
QWhat do we have to do to get there?
BILL MARCUS: At the California Public Utilities
Commission, we have a whole proceeding on
procurement which deals with the utilities, and
[president] Loretta Lynch, bless her heart, found the
statute that most of the rest of us have forgotten about,
which is 701.3 of the Public Utilities Code. It basically
says we have the right to set renewable procurement
requirements for the utilities.  I think that’s a good
lever, one we’re going to have to use. 
QThe other emergency responses entailed 24executive orders from the Governor, rangingfrom reducing energy use in state buildings,
which actually seems to have worked, to expedited
power-plant siting, and that’s something that seems to
have the longer term effect.  So, is there anything out
of that body of executive responses that we ought to
maintain and build upon?
BILL MARCUS: I can tell you we ought to stop the
expedited siting of power plants immediately and
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retroactively if possible.  From the rest of it I think
that clearly anything we can do that would produce
sustainable efficiency and I’m not talking about public
appeals.
QNot Flex Your Power televisioncommercials?
BILL MARCUS: Flex Your Power has some good stuff
in it.  I think we ought to work on behavior but the
fact that I was sitting over there without any light for
eight months, because we were having a crisis, I can’t
do that anymore.  And people can’t be expected to do
that.  Telling people to turn their computers off when
they go home at night, I don’t have a problem with
that.  But I also think that a number of things can be
done by encouraging investments of various sorts.
QWhat’s the way to sustain these kinds ofsavings, to build them into the system?  Wehave historic programs through the Public
Utilities Commission where the utilities spend $300
million a year or so.  What have we gotten out of those
programs?
BILL MARCUS: What we’ve gotten out of those
programs over time has been a block of savings, but
we’ve also gotten a bunch of politicization by the
utilities.  I think the utilities have a conflict of interest
in running conservation programs.  Utilities have an
inherent conflict of interest because conservation
programs reduce sales, reduce growth, make it more
difficult for their unregulated affiliates to build power
plants in the new world, make it more difficult for
them to build power plants in the old world, and I
don’t like the idea of simply giving them dueling
incentives.
QWe haven’t seen a clear concept of how togo forward from the Public UtilitiesCommission.  We have some voices that
want to go back to the old way.  We have some
pragmatic people.  We still have some holdovers from
the market forces, who still think it could work.
What’s your sense?  Where should we go in terms of
redefining regulation?
BILL MARCUS: I think it’s somewhere in between.  I
think that realistically there will be electricity markets
being developed and we have to do something in that
direction.  I’m not saying that we need to do it quickly.  
I think having 15 percent of your load on direct access
right now is cost shifting, pure and simple, getting out
from under the DWR contracts that made the market
safe for direct access, and I think that has to be either
rolled back or hit with exit fees.  
But that having been said I believe that there is a role
for retail markets.  If you are going to have retail
markets, the last thing I want is a retail market where
the utility has strong advantages over other retailers. If
you’re going to do competition, a necessary but not
sufficient condition for it to work for small customers,
is to make sure that the utility isn’t putting its thumb
on the scales and creating an unregulated monopoly
for itself out of a regulated monopoly.  
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I think one way it could go would be core or non-core,
although it should have gone there a year ago, where
the core customers have a lesser amount of choice but
get a fixed price portfolio and the industrials are on
their own.  The problem is we’ve got all these DWR
contracts and DWR debt overhang that has to be paid,
and it will become a massive cost shift if we don’t
straighten that out.
I’m not sure that isn’t a bad direction to go for the
long haul, but getting there is complicated by this
huge overhang of DWR contracts.  They’re the
elephant under the rug for anything we’re trying to do
to fix this market in any way.
QThe Legislature’s going to be coming backinto session, is there anything that youthink they should be doing?  Anything you
think they shouldn’t be doing?
BILL MARCUS: At the moment I really think that
what we ought to be doing is highly dependent on
these DWR contacts. I think the problem is the
Governor’s office is so entrenched in “We did a good
job” that they see that re-negotiation means losing face
and that’s the problem we’re all facing here.
Renegotiating contracts and selling bonds are what we
ought to be trying to do.  
Once we’ve done that I think the other things on our
plate are trying to get a procurement mechanism in
place which, again, at the moment is largely PUC
related although the Legislature may have a hand in it
in the future.  I’m not going to tell them what to do at
this point.  Three months from now I may have a
better idea of what they ought to do.
QWe talked about all the various agencies andyou had thoughts about the EnergyCommission, thoughts about the CPUC,
thoughts about the Power Authority.  And yet they’re
all discreet, they’re not working together.  How do we
bring the state structure into a mesh so that it is
actually moving in one direction?
BILL MARCUS: We have been trying to do this for
20 years and it has never worked and I’m not terribly
optimistic that we can do any better than we did in 20
years of trying to do this.  The redundant agency
looking for a mission is the Energy Commission.  And
they’ve been that for most of the last 20 years.  And I
think that short of trying to fold some of their
functions into the Power Authority and the rest into
the PUC, and maybe having a much smaller siting-
oriented body.  
I don’t think anybody’s going to do that because there’s
no political will to do that these days. I think
realistically, the Energy Commission is the one that has
the overlap with everybody else, but we’re not going to
solve that.
QLet’s just start with a broad, general sense ofhow are you feeling about California thesedays? 
ROBERT MICHAELS: Where are we in California
now?  We’re in for about 20 years of over-priced
power.  The entire premise of the Blue Book is gone.
It’s gone with the end of direct access if, in fact, direct
access ends.  It’s gone with the reappearance of state
government as an active participant, an active planner
and an active forecaster, none of which we’ve had really
good luck with in state governments in California or
anywhere else.  
If nothing is left of 1890, that would be great except
now you have a state that has a much more active role
both financially and politically in these markets than it
had at the time that 1890 was passed.  That causes all
sorts of complications on top of which you now have a
set of federal/state issues in jurisdictional conflicts. 
California is going to tilt one way or the other, and it
is not at all clear which way things are going to go.
We can’t live like this forever.  We can’t live with a
federal presence that we don’t understand and we can’t
really go back.  There’s nothing to go back to.  
QRight now direct access is held hostage orpossibly, put in lifetime solitaryconfinement, because of the political
response. The whole new level of stranded costs that
we’ve encountered with the Department of Water
Resources contracts and the fear was that people would
escape that liability, without thinking about other
alternatives except to terminate direct access.
MICHAELS: How do you bring direct access back?  I
don’t know.  I don’t have any easy obvious political
path.  Now, of course, you’ve got an administration
and a PUC which are interested, I think it’s safe to say,
in shifting most of the burden to large customers for
reasons that are nothing but political that I’ve been
able to find.  And you should wonder why because it’s
becoming more and more obvious that small
customers have had incredible price response, and if
you gave them the right to exercise a little creativity,
God knows what they might do. 
But there’s no obvious way to bring it back other than
by intimidation. And the intimidation that will
probably work is when more and more states have it
and we go back to where we really were before the
Blue Book or you have industrials and related users
saying we can’t compete in the market where we’ve
now got working direct-access systems scattered
elsewhere in the country so we can’t say that the
deregulation was a failure and we have to go back to
[CPUC member] Carl Wood’s ideal world.  
QYou raised the one regulator who probablyis most interested in returning to perceived“good old days” of command and control
regulation, cost-of-service-based rate making.  That
whole era of regulation, that evolved over 75 or nearly
100 years, what was good about it?  Is there any part
of it that’s worth preserving to the future?
MICHAELS: Don’t you really wonder what the utility
business would look like today if a regulatory system
had not pretty much from the start rewarded utilities
for making large investments?  Do you really think
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that you would see a system that was unreliable and in
any important sense inferior or less efficient if in fact it
had not been regulated and you’d had more
competitive pricing all the way along? 
You would have had much more energy service-type
companies than utilities.  Utilities had to be dragged
into the energy service business through the ‘70’s and
‘80’s.  The system that you got is basically a massive
system.  
Now it wasn’t all bad.  One of the things that came
out of this was tremendous growth in the efficiency of
large generation plants, which suited both utilities and
regulators.  So with the regulated utility system we got
some technological advance.  
It’s a uniquely American institution; that is the other
thing about regulation and nobody has really thought
about what that means.  Public power doesn’t appear
to be doing much worse than regulated power, didn’t
appear to be doing that much worse at the time.  
And that’s for two reasons.  The first is that private
utilities, given the nature of regulation came to look
like government agencies, and the electricity business
being what it is, municipal utilities had to start
watching their costs and acting more like private
corporations than most branches of government.  And
they all kind of blurred and what competition there
was really wasn’t that meaningful.
QNow we have a different kind of publicinvolvement in the power market, which isthe state direct intervention through the
purchasing activities of the Department of Water
Resources, both on the spot market and in the long-
term contracts, and the newer critter, the Power
Authority. How do you feel about state intervention in
markets, even as emergency response or as a long-term
permanent fixture.
MICHAELS: The difficulty with emergency responses
is they last well beyond emergencies.  In fact, you’re
sort of seeing that with the Power Authority.  [Dave]
Freeman’s great job right now is going to be to put as
much hardware in place as possible, because the more
of that stuff you’ve got in place, the harder it is to
dismantle this authority and the bigger the political
embarrassment it’s going to be if you try.  
There is no precedent for the California State Power
Authority. If there ever was a rationale when the Power
Authority was first proposed, it was critical that the
state take over the transmission system and be able to
exempt it from federal regulation.  Because otherwise
anything the Power Authority tries doing, other than
encouraging conservation, immediately runs afoul with
transmission bottlenecks and federal law.  Without that
you have somebody who’s got a few power plants in
place and is going to talk about how wonderful it is
that California has still more peakers which are
somehow going to protect us against—against what?
Against spot market prices?  Against contracts that
could have been made that were more respectful of
market conditions?  
What does the Power Authority protect us against?
And even if you think you want protection, do you
want it in the form of a Power Authority that’s in the
hands of state government and run by people who
rightly or wrongly believe they have a mission in life.
I’d rather have it run by faceless bureaucrats any day.
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QIt’s been suggested that one of the roles thatthe Power Authority can legitimately, take,because everybody else seems to have
dropped the ball, is resource planning.  Now we’ve
moved away from a belief that “let the market” decide
will answer our problems.  But do we need an agency
that does this kind of resource planning and
implements it?
MICHAELS: I don’t think that there’s really a
difficulty in letting the market decide, generally
speaking. You want to plan?  Plan for that
infrastructure that’s going to allow ordinary people to
make their own decisions on generation and
consumption and facilitate them making trades.  I
don’t want the state going into the generation business,
and I don’t think that there’s any good reason to have
it second-guessing people who are making their own
decisions.  What it could do usefully is in the area of
transmission and for a variety of reasons it won’t.
QOne place where we have seen people makea decision is in the conservation response. Itseems to be the most positive thing that’s
come out of this.
MICHAELS: And it would have come out a lot
sooner if people had been able to feel market prices. 
What was really going on?  Was this simply people
catching a religious fervor, or was it that they were
really responding to prices?  And I think the evidence
that’s coming out so far, I know that Jim Bushnell at
UC Energy Institute has co-authored a piece looking
at San Diego as a control experiment back in the days
when they were at the mercy of PX prices.  And what
they seem to be finding is that you’re seeing price
response, it’s coming much, much faster than people
expect it, although of course that doesn’t surprise me.  
QAmong the emergency responses we talkedabout the Power Authority and the DWRbut a whole host, 24-26 different executive
orders emanating from the Governor’s office which
expedited power plant citing, loosened some
environmental rules in order to expedite power plant
citing or increase the availability of units, requiring
state agencies to participate in conservation programs,
et al.  What of that package of stuff should we
maintain? 
MICHAELS: They should look first to understanding
why these orders had to be put in place to begin with.
What was the problem that had to be solved by
expediting siting?  Answer.  Delays that ran into years
at places like the Energy Commission, which at best
most people can tell were not warranted.  
As far as expediting things is concerned, I don’t really
think that it is the emergency it was a few months ago.
If you have to have a war, you’re going to have these
things happening but get rid of them when the war is
over.  This was thought to be a 20-year war, it turns
out to be a one-year war as far as the really acute
problems are concerned.  So I would say treat it as an
interesting history lesson and now that we probably
know something about demand and supply, hope that
it doesn’t happen again and put in place institutions to
keep it from happening.
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QThe Federal Energy Regulatory Commissionseems to have a vision of a West-widemarketplace that mimics the physical
constraints of reliability regions.  California either is
trying to busy building walls around itself or our
neighbors are building walls themselves in California.
Let’s talk about the region because one of the problems
with California is that we tend to view ourselves as an
island when we’re not.  We are part of an
interconnected grid, 11 states, two other countries, all
trading power.  Electrons don’t particularly care about
borders.  
MICHAELS: And it’s been a remarkably well-
functioning market.  It’s able to handle hydro
transactions in the Northwest, coal-based transactions
in the Southwest.  You see the power flowing in
different directions seasonally and with temperature
gradients.  It’s already a very remarkable market and
that seems to be something that at least a lot of the
popular press and the like forgot during the entire
restructuring and during the recent crisis.  
Now, the question is what needs to be done on top of
it?  Answer.  You probably do want some kind of
transmission authority, some type of transmission
scheduling authority and the rest.  Some type of RTO
organization is necessary.  The big question with it is,
how will the transmission be priced? Or will there be
something approximating property rights?
FERC does not listen to how people actually transact,
because if they did they would be much less interested
in trying to force uniform market designs on
everybody.  So the transmission pricing has to be
solved. My argument would be why don’t you start by
simply trying to make property rights as ordinary as
they can be and leaving it go at that?  FERC is trying
to regulate competition using the same tools it uses to
regulate monopoly, comparing prices against booked
costs, and finding discrepancies and saying this is
unjust and unreasonable.  
QWe talked about the restructuring packageas devised in California, whether any of itwas worth keeping, you suggest little of it.
But the goals of restructuring—lower costs, more
choice, innovative technologies.  Can we rehabilitate
those roles?  Can we rehabilitate the market to get to
those goals or is it time to redefine goals?
MICHAELS: Why would you want to redefine goals?
These are simply goals that we expect of any well-
functioning economic system.  They’re just a hop, skip
and a jump from life, liberty and the pursuit of
happiness.  These are goals that competitive markets
are supposedly—and I think provably superior, in
getting us to—in both theory and in practice.
QOkay, so if we’re not redefining the goals,we’re redefining the path?
MICHAELS: Yes.
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QWhat path makes the most economic senseheading into the future?  It may take twoyears, so we have this time period which
beneficially we could use.
MICHAELS: But every time we’ve planned we’ve
devised the worst plan.  And we’ve embodied it in laws
and in a large number of ways we are worse off than
we were the day the Blue Book came out although we
do have some customers with direct access and we do
have a lot of experience, some of which have been
useful.  
The real question is going to be: What do you think
government can really do about this?  What do you
really think government can do to bring this about—
state government in particular.  Economics forces
people to think about the costs that they’re imposing
and the costs that they’re bearing.  Politics is in so
many ways just a way of shifting things in ways that
will create long-term problems.
There was one committee meeting during the special
session that somebody was addressing the committee
and said, “First do no harm,” and [Senator] Debra
Bowen said, “I think we’re already past that stage.
QI’d like to just open it up by asking you this;is there anything out of the package ofAB 1890 that’s worth trying to preserve as
we move forward.
FRANK WOLAK: I guess I don’t think there’s any
sort of choice.  The market is there.  It’s going to stay
there.  It’s going to be difficult to get rid of. To me the
missing ingredient was no retail infrastructure,
meaning that the metering to actually record what
people consumed in the hour that they consumed it is
a major problem, is still a major problem.  There are
the meters.  Unfortunately the PUC won’t enact the
tariffs and so that’s sort of the problem. 
QIt’s fairly unlikely that we will resurrect thePower Exchange.  How important was that?
FRANK WOLAK: Not at all really. The big thing that
the Power Exchange did is it was a mechanism to
recover the competition transition charge because it
was the “transparent price” that could then be the
wholesale price used to determine how much CTC
someone got. In a world in which there isn’t that CTC
recovery mechanism there’s no real need for that price.
In particular, you could recover the stranded assets
from simply a per unit charge on every unit of
electricity consumed and therefore you don’t even have
to know what price is being charged.
QThe Independent System Operator, simplein concept, very difficult and complex toactually work through all the bugs. What
needs to be done to make the ISO fully functional, as
efficient as you’d like it to be and to prevent the kinds
of gamings and manipulations that have been alleged
in the market?
WOLAK: Well, first I guess what I’d say is, separate
gaming and manipulation from just simple unilateral
maximizing profits, and I think there’s plenty of
evidence that that’s what firms did.  Whether or not
there’s any sort of gaming, manipulation, I don’t know
that those are even well-defined legal concepts or even
economic concepts.
A lot of it is just simply avoiding the tendency to be
arbitrary and intervene in the market and just simply
use the signals that you already have available in the
tariff to effectively make this system stay balanced.
And it’s difficult because I think in many ways
engineers don’t have faith that markets can provide the
appropriate signals and certainly the suppliers of power
are very willing to try and play on that and you have
this problem. But every single time the ISO becomes a
participant in the market, problems happen.  
QIt seems that the current thrust with theISO is to try and—not dictate—but todefine what the cost ought to be.  We see all
these charts all the time about what they think the
competitive price should be and what people are
bidding in, and going to FERC and saying, “Well this
is a no-no and we should do something about it.”
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WOLAK: My view would be is this is certainly
something that you’d want to compute and that you’d
want to report to FERC that this is what we’d expect
the market to do.  
Now the question is how is that going to come about?.
One way to make that come about is to put in bid
caps and price caps and all that sort of thing, which is
not something that I think is really in the long-term
interest of the market. 
The thing about markets, and this gets back to the
issue of management risk, is that markets are about
assigning risk to those who are best able to bear it, and
if these sorts of things don’t get priced, things won’t
happen.  
In particular if you don’t allow people to see price risk,
they won’t hedge.  If you don’t allow people to see
price risk they won’t invest in demand-response
technology.  So in some sense, that’s the fundamental
chicken-and-egg problem in this whole thing. If you
continue with these sort of bandages, you’ll never get
to where you eventually want to go. Nor will you
eventually get benefits consumers would achieve from
a competitive market, but that’s going to require
consumers to manage price risks, to manage their
consumption. 
If that’s not something that you want to do, then the
smart thing to do would be to go back to the regulated
world.  But given that you’re here, I think that people,
just like they manage the price risks associated with all
other markets, can manage this price risk and benefit
from the existence of the market.  But if you don’t
then what you’ve got is completely inelastic demand,
and then you have the possibilities for all the problems
that happen.
QWhat was good about the regulatory systemthat ought to be preserved going into thefuture, anything from your point of view?
WOLAK: What was good about the regulatory system
is that it protects the poor, the indigent, the people
who tend to get hurt in market environments.  So in
that sense, what we want to do is put in a regulator
structure that helps people to participate in the
market, so that you educate people: “Here’s how you
may want to think about purchasing your electricity,
here’s a technology that may make sense for you to be
able to do this sort of thing.”
Help the people become better participants in the
market and to not get burned by the market. But for
the big customers, they can take care of themselves. 
QThe regulatory response is to do things likeimpose price caps and to try and wrest backcontrol of the market and to bring the
utilities back to a traditional position so that they can
be controlled. And that’s what’s happening in
California right now.  In the long run,  is there a role
for a price cap, what people call a “circuit breaker”?
WOLAK: I would prefer not to have a price cap at all,
because it’s all about managing risk, and if very high
prices can both harm as well as hurt producers, and so
I see it as less of an issue.  I think it also kills off the
incentive for people to invest in the demand-responsive
technologies.  
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QWhat do you think the role of the PowerAuthority ought to be?
WOLAK: I really don’t see any need for it, to be
honest.  I think that the one thing that the market can
do just fine is build power plants, and I think it can
build them at a pretty low cost.  So I guess what I’d say
is that the current solution is just going to set in
motion the possibility of a new disaster.  
Now the good news is, if the state continues to hang
on to the forward contracts even though they’re at very
high rates, at least you’ve got the hedge in terms that
the generators have to deliver; they can’t withhold to
drive up price or whatever and it’s not profitable for
them to do so if they have these hedges.  At least it
won’t be too bad.  But then you have the problem of
how do you pay for this “stranded asset” which is the
contracts.
QRight, and that’s going to be a problem inthe future.  If you were to give advice to theLegislature or to the Governor for what we
ought to be doing to position ourselves, what would
you suggest that we do?
WOLAK: You’ve got to have a retail side of the
market.  If you don’t you’ve either got to stay on the
side of regulation, in other words, go from essentially
production to final sale of the product under
regulation, or you’ve got to go all the way to
competition. Hybrid solutions are the analogy to
standing the middle of the busy street.  You’ve got to
be on one side of the street, but standing in the
middle’s just going to get you hit.  And we’re sort of
stuck being with a competitive market unless of course
the state decides to purchase all the power plants back
from everybody to build a sufficient amount to
essentially allow all these plants to be retired.  
So my view is that we’ve got a wholesale market.  The
wholesale market works quite well if you’re in a
situation where effectively you’ve got effective
competition and the difficulty with 2000 is we didn’t
have effective competition. The way you solve that
problem is by getting the demand side involved and
how that demand side gets involved is you treat
demand just like you treat generation.
By that I mean every generator, their default price is
the real-time price. If you fail to contract, if you fail to
do anything with your electrons before the delivery of
the electrons, you receive the ISOs imbalance price.
And the same thing should be true of load.  If you fail
to hedge up till the time of delivery, you will pay the
ISO’s real time imbalanced price for the power that
you consume. 
Just that simple change and then worked all the way
back to load, will solve the problem. The only way
you’re going to get that to work is by open access to
transmission, open access to distribution and then
retailers can effectively buy and sell…buy electricity
wholesale, sell it to customers retail. And then the
other aspect is the ability to measure it. You have to be
able to measure it at the same level of time aggregation
that you’re actually buying it.  
I think it would benefit consumers.  People would
change how they have to consume electricity in the
sense that you would see more flexibility in how
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people consume.  I think that’s only enhancing the
welfare or consumers rather than detracting, because
you have to build less power plants, you have to build
less transmission lines, all those sorts of things.  
You’ve got to get the retail side involved in the market
and load involved in the market and that requires the
infrastructure in the form of metering to measure it at
the hourly basis.  That’s not that expensive to do.
Then the other is you’ve just got to let people see the
risks and they make the choices based on that.
If you don’t want to go that route then I guess go back
to the other side of the world and just be a state power
authority that does everything.  Now that’s going to
very costly would be my estimate if recent history is
any indication and thus far it’s been quite costly.
